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LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
WRONGFUL DEATH IN LOUISIANA: Too
OFTEN A "CAUSE" WITHOUT A "RIGHT"
Alice and Joseph Roche planned to adopt the two abandoned
children who had been living with them for several years. But
before the adoption proceedings were completed, Joseph Roche was
killed. One month later, Alice Roche signed the final decree of adop-
tion.1 On behalf of her two newly adopted children, she filed a
wrongful death action against the defendant. The Supreme Court of
Louisiana held that since the decree was not final at the time of the
decedent's death, the children were not included wthin the first
class of beneficiaries2 in Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 and thus
had no action for the wrongful death of their prospective father.'
Roche v. Big Moose Oil Field Truck Service, 381 So. 2d 396 (La.
1980).
The first Louisiana decision involving a claim by survivors for
damages suffered from the death of a relative was the 1851 case of
Hubgh v. New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company.' In
1. Under R.S. 9:429-32, the procedure for adopting a child is not completed (thus
no "adoption" occurs) until the final decree has been granted. "Adoption is a creature
of statutory law, and being in derogation of the natural right of a parent to his or her
child such statutes are always strictly construed." Rodden V. Davis, 293 So. 2d 578, 580
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
2. Civil Code article 2315 limits the action for wrongful death to certain named
beneficiaries, one of whom is "children." The article further provides that "the words
'child', 'brother', 'sister', 'father', and 'mother' include a child, brother, sister, father,
and mother, by adoption, respectively." LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315.
3. Since the purpose of this note is to examine Louisiana's statutory delimita-
tions of those survivors entitled to bring an action in wrongful death, this note will not
address the second holding in Roche which concerns an issue in workers' compensa-
tion. The court held that when an employer files suit for indemnification against a
third-party tortfeasor, the injured employee does not have to intervene in the
employer's pending lawsuit but may maintain a separate action for damages against
the third-party tortfeasor. Roche v. Big Moose Oil Field Truck Ser., 381 So. 2d 396,
401-02 (La. 1980). For a discussion of this issue, see Developments in the Law,
1979-1980-Workers' Compensation, 41 LA. L. REv. 557 (1980).
4. 6 La. Ann. 495 (1851). As early as 1856, in Hermann v. The New Orleans &
Carrollton R.R. Co., 11 La. Ann. 5, 22 (1856), the court expressed some doubt about the
wisdom of the Hubgh decision, but nevertheless opted to go with precedents: "The
authorities on which the decisions in the case of Hubgh was based, have been sub-
jected to the severest tests of examination and criticism, and were the question res
nova, we should feel great difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory conclusion." Once the
legislature responded by "creating" a cause of action, the court's discussion was usually
a merely perfunctory reiteration of the Hubgh decision: "It is too well settled for
dispute that . . . under the Civil Code of 1825 . . . no action would lie for damages for
the death of a free person." Vaughn v. Dalton-Lard Lumber Co., Ltd., 119 La. 61, 63,
43 So. 926, 927 (1907). But in King v. Cancienne, 316 So. 2d 366, 369 (La. 1975), Justice
Barham, after examining the history of wrongful death and article 2315, wrote:
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Hubgh, Louisiana adopted the questionable common law maxim that
no wrongful death cause of action exists except that which has been
created by the legislature.' The wisdom of judicial approval of this
maxim in England,' the United States,' and Louisiana,' in particular,
has been in considerable doubt for some time.'
The simple concept behind the wrongful death action is that he
who is injured by the wrongful death of another should recover
damages from the tortfeasor. ° But since this concept must serve a
society complex in its competing demands and not often given to
careful introspection, the principle behind wrongful death often is
obscured when state legislators attempt to "create" wrongful death
"Hubgh was in error and the legislature in 1884 attempted to correct this error by
naming certain survivors who could claim this independent right of action." Since
King, the courts have ventured increasingly to criticize Hubgh. Callais v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 334 So. 2d 692 (La. 1975); Branch v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 370 So. 2d 1270, 1273
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1979) ("[Ilt is clear that the right to recover for wrongful death in
Louisiana originated long before the 1855 and 1884 amendments to Article 2315"); Viau
v. Batiste, 332 So. 2d at 513 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976) (Lemmon, J., concurring specially).
For a strong criticism of the Hubgh decision, see Voss, The Recovery of Damages for
Wrongful Death at Common Law, at Civil Law, and in Louisiana, 6 TUL. L. REV. 201
(1931).
5. 6 La. Ann. at 496. "[Wlithout a special statute authorizing such actions, they
cannot be maintained. It is a strong argument in favor of this view of the law, that in a
country where private rights are so well protected as they are in England, it is settled
that those actions do not exist at common law." Id. The court, after admitting that ar-
ticle 2294 (now article 2315) was a literal translation of Code Napoldon article 1382 and
that the Cour de Cassation had granted a right of action for wrongful death under that
article, nevertheless contended that "great as our deference is for that enlightened
tribunal, we are unable to adopt their conclusions." Id. at 497. A statutory remedy for
wrongful death now exists in every state. For a thorough analysis of wrongful death
statutes, see S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH (1966). For criticism of the
common law position, see note 9, infra. For the current French position, see note 50,
infra.
6. Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808). Lord Ellenborough, a man "whose
forte was never common sense," according to Dean Prosser, W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS 901 (4th ed. 1971), declared in Baker that "in a civil Court, the death of a human
being could not be complained of as an injury .... " 170 Eng. Rep. at 1033.
7. Carey v. Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475 (1848), generally is accorded
the dubious honor of establishing this maxim in the United States. Without examining
the validity of Lord Ellenborough's decision in Baker, the Carey court parroted the
"rule" established in England in 1808: "Such, then, we cannot doubt, is the doctrine of
the common law; and it is decisive against the maintenance of these actions." Id. at
478. See note 9, infra.
8. See note 5, supra.
9. See generally Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L.Q.
REV. 431 (1916); Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043 (1965);
Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REV. 605
(1960). See note 4, supra.
10. Oppenheim, The Survival of Tort Actions and the Action for Wrongful
Death-A Survey and a Proposal, 16 TUL. L. REV. 386, 429 (1942).
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actions in an ad hoc and piecemeal fashion." Each hastily con-
structed remedy is designed primarily to rectify some flaw, but un-
fortunately too often results in creating only more confusion. The in-
ability to see through the specifics of particular situations to the
underlying principle also may account for the initial erroneous direc-
tions taken by courts. 2
From the outset Louisiana's experience with wrongful death"
11. The criticism of wrongful death statutes is unending; for the ... approach ...
was frequently conceived in haste by the lawmakers and tended to break down
when placed into practical operation. Too often there was imposed upon the
statutory structure an agglomerate of judicial patchwork as courts attempted to
obscure the problems or to reconcile the irreconcilable. The need to evolve a
single adequate and realistic approach for the handling of wrongful death has
proffered a baffling challenge to legislatures and courts for more than a century ....
Malone, American Fatal Accident Statutes-Part I The Legislative Birth Pains, 1965
DUKE L.J. 673, 719.
12. It is impossible to understand the confusion surrounding wrongful death
without knowing something about its history:
Up until [the nineteenth century] unnatural death meant largely death by violence
in the popular sense of the word. It was the work of the robber, the burglar, or
the hot-blooded man. Usually the culprit was executed or confined behind bars.
Even if he were left free in society he was usually without any means to compen-
sate the bereaved family of the victim. In this setting, wrongful death was a mat-
ter of little concern to the civil law, and lawmen developed no tools for the hand-
ling of it. Then, suddenly at mid-century society faced up in panic to a virtually
new phenomenon-accidental death through corporate enterprise. Tragedy as a
result of indifference and neglect was suddenly upon us in the factory, on the city
streets, and on the rails. Nor was the principal villain of the piece any longer the
impecunious felon. In his place stood the prospering corporation with abundant
assets to meet the needs of widows and orphans.
It is obvious that law was destined to respond to this violent shift in the
human equation-but through which agency and by what means was the change
to take place? Many have taken the position that common-law judges were stag-
gered at this point, that they could not adapt their archaic conceptions to the new
need, and that the resulting void was finally filled when the legislatures came to
the rescue.
Malone, supra note 9, at 1043.
13. See Van Amburg v. Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pac. R.R. Co., 37 La. Ann. 650,
651 (1885). The Van Amburg decision illustrates the court's reaction in denying a right
of action to a particularly deserving plaintiff because the newly enacted statute did not
become effective until a few days after plaintiffs cause of action arose:
Legislation and jurisprudence have combined to perpetuate the extraordinary
doctrine that the life of a freeman cannot be made the subject of valuation, and
under the domination of that dogmatic utterance .... the singular spectacle has
been witnessed of courts sanctioning damages for short-lived pains and refusing
them for long-life sorrow and the pecuniary losses consequent upon the death of
one from who was derived support, comfort and even the necessary stays of life.
See note 17, infra, for a history of the amendments to LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315. See also
Malone, supra note 9, at 1071.
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has been consistent with that of other states.' The first decision in
Louisiana rejected the argument that article 2315 of the Civil Code,
without amendment, could serve as the basis for a cause of action
for wrongful death.'5 Repeated legislative amendments have failed
to produce a flexible, workable statute.'6 The main flaw that has
plagued Louisiana's wrongful death statute is simply that adherence
to the terms of the statute often cannot produce a just result.
The "creation" of Louisiana's wrongful death cause of action
came in 1884.'1 From its inception the action has been limited to cer-
tain named beneficiaries." These beneficiaries are listed in three
mutually exclusive classes; thus, once a beneficiary is found in a
14. In the common law only the idea of a general wrongful death statute was new.
States had attempted to deal with wrongful death in specific situations. As a result, a
few very narrow statutes granted death actions (e.g., an action for death caused by a
defect in a highway), but these statutes were totally inadequate for handling the sud-
den proliferation of wrongful death actions. See note 12, supra. For examples of these
early statues, see Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222, 227 (Mass. 1972). See also
Malone, supra note 9, at 1071; Malone, supra note 11. The first wrongful death statutes
were, not surprisingly, also rather narrow and short-sighted, and, in fact, have con-
tinued to the present to be plagued by inflexibility.
15. See note 5, supra.
16. General dissatisfaction with wrongful death in Louisiana is evidenced by the
numerous articles on the subject. See, e.g., Johnson, Death on the Callais Coach: The
Mystery of Louisiana Wrongful Death and Survival Actions, 37 LA. L. REv. 1 (1976);
Oppenheim, supra note 10; Voss, supra note 4; Comment Survival of Actions in Arti-
cle 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code: The Victim's Actions and the Wrongful Death
Action, 43 TUL. L. REV. 330 (1969); Note, Wrongful Death Action by a Surviving
Putative Spouse-How Large an Extension, 22 Loy. L. REV. 359 (1976).
17. 1884 La. Acts, No. 71. Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 has been amended
seven times. The original article contained only what is now the first sentence: "Every
act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it hap-
pened to repair it." Act 223 of 1855 granted a survival action in favor of the widow and
minor children, and in their default, to the surviving mother or father. Act 71 of 1884
added the action for wrongful death. Act 120 of 1908 expanded the beneficiaries to in-
clude brothers and sisters and permitted major children to recover if no widow or
minor children survived the decedent. Act 159 of 1916 changed the word "widow" to
"surviving spouse." Act 159 of 1932 and Act 333 of 1948 added language to include
beneficiaries by adoption. The final amendment, Act 30 of 1960, merely restructured
the article to reflect changes made in the Code of Civil Procedure.
18. Louisiana currently gives the following individuals a right of action under arti-
cle 2315:
(1) the surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased, or either such
spouse or such child or children; (2) the surviving father and mother of the deceased,
or either of them, if he left no spouse or child surviving; and (3) the surviving
brothers and sisters of the-4eceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse, child, or
parent surviving ....
For a thorough discussion of beneficiaries entitled to an action, see Johnson, supra
note 16, at 13-21.
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preferred class, no one in the remaining classes can recover. 9 The
jurisprudence consistently has refused to expand the listed benefi-
ciaries by going beyond the literal wording of the statute."
This arbitrary listing of named beneficiaries in mutually exclu-
sive classes has been the source of both difficulty and injustice in
Louisiana. The family member who suffers damage from the dece-
dent's wrongful death frequently is not a listed beneficiary; 1 conse-
quently, the injured party has no remedy. For example, grandchil-
dren never have been accorded an action for wrongful death. 2 Thus
when two orphaned grandchildren (whose sole source of support had
been their grandfather) sought to recover damages resulting from
the wrongful death of their grandfather, the court denied a
remedy. 3 Stepparents have suffered the same fate. When the step-
father, who had been a father to the deceased in every way but
biologically, attempted to bring an action for the wrongful death of
his stepdaughter, the court denied him redress because he was not a
"father" under article 2315. Only the "real" father could qualify as
the proper plaintiff; the designated beneficiary was the plaintiff's
biological father, who had seen his daughter only once between her
birth in 1944 and her death in 1959. '
19. Whether the beneficiary in the preferred class actually can recover is irrele-
vant. The court first looks to the status of the beneficiaries at the time of the dece-
dent's death. Brock v. Friend, 4 La. App. 723 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1925) (plaintiff was
decedent's widow at the time of death but had remarried when she brought suit). Then
the court examines each class successively to determine which survivors have a right
of action. The fact that the preferred beneficiary may have died, Wakefield v. Govern-
ment Employees Ins. Co., 253 So. 2d 667 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971), or may have been
barred from recovery by contributory negligence, Gonzales v. Succession of Medica,
141 So. 2d 887 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962), does not "empty" the preferred class. If a
beneficiary exists in a preferred class, no one in the remaining classes is entitled to an
action. See note 26, infra, -and accompanying text.
20. "Those not included are excluded, and [the article] cannot be construed so as
to confer the right upon persons not expressly mentioned in it." Walton v. Booth, 34
La. Ann. 913, 914 (1882). "Laws conferring rights of action to sue for damages upon
persons bearing certain relationship to a deceased are strictly construed. They may
not be extended by interpretation to persons not clearly embraced therein." Thompson
v. Vestal Lumber & Mfg. Co., 16 So. 2d 594, 596 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1943). See Chatman
v. Martin, 245 So. 2d 423, 426 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
21. See Johnson, supra note 16.
22. See note 18, supra. Grandchildren consistently have been denied an action
despite the definition of children contained in Civil Code article 3556(8):
"Children-Under this name are comprehended, not only the children of the first
degree, but the grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and all other descendants in the
direct line .... " For other cases denying grandchildren an action, see Viau v. Batiste,
332 So. 2d 512 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976); Smith v. Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co., 299 So.
2d 517 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 So. 2d 617 (La. 1974).
23. Walker v. Vicksburg, 110 La. 718, 34 So. 749 (1903).
24. Palmer v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 126 So. 2d 777 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
Since the plaintiff could not prove that he had been damaged, he received only a
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Even if he is a named beneficiary, the injured party often is
precluded from bringing an action because he is preempted by a
beneficiary in a preferred class.25 Thus when the husband, wife, and
son were killed instantly and the daughter survived two hours
before dying, the action belonged to the unconscious daughter. Since
the action lodged in the first class of beneficiaries, all other sur-
vivors (in this case the parents of the deceased husband and wife) ef-
fectively were precluded from bringing an action. 6 Another injured
survivor in the second class of beneficiaries was denied redress
when the judicially separated spouse was granted the sole right of
action to the exclusion of the deceased's mother, who had been totally
dependent upon her son for her livelihood. 7 In an early case, the
court denied standing to the deceased's major children, granted an
action to the deceased's wife, who was living with another man, and
nominal award of $500. Thus while the court has a mechanism (limitation of damages)
for assuring that the "wrong" plaintiff (e.g., the legal father) is not rewarded, no
mechanism exists for assuring that the "right" plaintiff (e.g., the stepfather) is compen-
sated for his injury. For a similar case, see Cosey v. Allen, 316 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1975), in which the court refused to reward a "named" beneficiary:
It is offensive to reason, human dignity and the memories of these little children
that their father who callously ignored them during their lives should now reap
benefits from their deaths .... While the law compels the conclusion that Willie
Cosey is the legal father of these children, it does not compel the conclusion that
he was damaged by their deaths. This is a matter which depends not upon a codal
presumption but upon the facts, and the facts require us to hold that he was not
damaged at all, not even nominally.
Id. at 516-17.
25. See note 18, supra.
26. Leitch & Wakefield v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 253 So. 2d 667 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1971). The grandparents could have inherited the deceased grand-
daughter's wrongful death action, but they could recover only what she could have
recovered-which would be nothing since she never regained consciousness after the
accident. Thus the action effectively perished with the deceased. For a similar case,
see Walker v. St. Paul Ins. Cas., 343 So. 2d 251 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977), in which the
wife lived fifteen minutes and the husband lived forty-five minutes after a head-on
automobile collision. This unfortunate need to ascertain the time of death for purposes
of determining the proper beneficiary in wrongful death actions sometimes gives rise
to the macabre. In a murder-suicide case the court was able to grant an action to the
parents of the deceased wife only after closely examining the evidence and concluding
that the husband's self-inflicted wound had resulted in instantaneous death and that
the wife had lingered long enough to attempt to crawl from the blood-smeared bed,
thus outliving her husband-the only person who could have preempted the parents as
a beneficiary, von Dameck v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 361 So. 2d 283 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1978).
27. Harris v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 48 So. 2d 728 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950).
In a similar case the decedent left his wife shortly after they married. He lived with
and supported his mother for three-and-one-half years before his death; the estranged
wife, not the dependent mother, was the designated survivor entitled to maintain an
action. Clark v. Tenneco, Inc. 353 So. 2d 418 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
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commented that the "article makes no distinction between a faithful
and unfaithful wife.1
28
Preoccupation with adherence to the letter of the law has led
even to constitutional problems. The Supreme Court of Louisiana
held repeatedly that illegitimates did not have a right of action
under the wrongful death statute 9 until the United States Supreme
Court declared in Levy v. Louisiana" that such an exclusion con-
stitutes invidious discrimination and violates the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thrusting illegitimates into the
statutory scheme enmeshed the Louisiana courts in an even more
complicated search for the proper plaintiff, because natural mothers
and fathers then had to be defined.' Now the court must decide
such issues as whether the plaintiff is "plainly" 2 the father if the
deceased child is illegitimate. The focus of these cases, as in many
other cases," is not on whether the plaintiff indeed was injured, but
on whether he is a named beneficiary.
The instant case is a typical example of the problems inherent in
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315's listing of named beneficiaries.
28. Jones v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 55 So. 2d 88 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1951).
29. Any illegitimate relationship has served to deny the plaintiff a right of action:
Youchican v. Texas & Pac. R.R. Co., 147 La. 1080, 86 So. 551 (1920); Green v. New
Orleans, S. & G. I. R. Co., 141 La. 120, 74 So. 717 (1917); Lynch v. Knoop, 118 La. 611,
43 So. 252 (1907); Thompson v. Vestal Lumber & Mfg. Co., 16 So. 2d 594 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1943). The court has acknowledged the harsh results often attendant upon such
decisions: "The result may have its hard phases. It is none the less the law." Landry v.
American Creosote Works, Ltd., 119 La. 231, 43 So. 1016 (1907).
30. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
31. See, e.g., Warren v. Richard, 296 So. 2d 813 (La. 1974) (legitimate child of one
man has right of action for wrongful death of biological father); Simmons v. Brooks,
342 So. 2d 236 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977) (adopted child has no right of action for
wrongful death of biological father); Moore v. Thunderbird, 331 So. 2d 555 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1976) (natural father has right of action for wrongful death of biological il-
legitimate child); Honeycutt v. City of Monroe, 253 So. 2d 597 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971)
(natural mother has right of action for wrongful death of illegitimate child). These
cases provide good examples of the tangential problems created when the court
focuses on defining beneficiaries as opposed to measuring damages. The impact of such
decisions is far-reaching. For example, "[tlhey breach a hitherto impregnable bastion of
our codal scheme-the presumption that the husband of the mother is the father of all
children conceived during the marriage." Spaht & Shaw, The Strongest Presumption
Challenged& Speculations on Warren v. Richard and Succession of Mitchell, 37 LA. L.
REv. 59, 60 (1976). In Danos v. St Pierre, 383 So. 2d 1019 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980), and
Diefenderfer v. La. Farm Bur. Mut. Ins., 383 So. 2d 1032, (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980), the
court wrestled with the complicated and wide-ranging issue of whether a fetus is a
person. The real issue should be whether an action in wrongful death should even give
rise to that inquiry.
32. Honeycutt v. City of Monroe, 253 So. 2d 597, 602 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
33. See notes 21-28, supra.
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The "almost adopted" children of Roche were not designated
specifically in the statute as survivors entitled to bring an action;3
therefore, despite the plaintiff's efforts 35 and the court's obvious
sympathy, no redress existed for the children's loss. 36 But while the
holding is consistent with the prior jurisprudence" and is in accord-
ance with the terms of the statute, the result is unsatisfactory. The
purpose and spirit of the wrongful death action are not being served,
because technically correct decisions under the existing statute too
often are not only unjust but illogical.38
One possible solution is to recognize a separate cause of action
under the first sentence of article 2315. A few common law jurisdic-
tions have "discovered" such an action in order to avoid a perceived
injustice.39 However, despite general agreement that an action for
34. See note 2, supra.
35. Plaintiff presented five arguments: (1) the minor children were totally depen-
dent upon deceased; (2) the Roches had committed themselves twice through contract
to care for the children; (3) the doctrine of equitable adoption should apply; (4) the pro-
spective adoptive children should be treated as well as illegitimates; and (5) the
children should be treated as "posthumous children" entitled to the benefits of Civil
Code article 29. 381 So. 2d at 399. For a discussion of the equitable adoption doctrine
in wrongful death actions, see Note, Decedent's Heirs Under the Utah Wrongful
Death Act, 1979 UTAH L. REV.. 77, 89-90.
36. The court freely admitted that the children were dependent upon the deceased
for economic and emotional support, but concluded that that fact was irrelevant, since
the children were "neither [decedent's] biological nor his adoptive 'children."' Despite
the equity of the plaintiffs position, none of his arguments served "to make these
children the adoptive children of decedent within the meaning of Article 2315." 381 So.
2d at 399.
37. See notes 18-21, supra, and accompanying text.
38. See note 16, supra.
39. Two states, Hawaii and Georgia, have recognized a common law right of ac-
tion. See Kake v. Horton, 2 Hawaii 209 (1860); Rohlfing v. Moses Akinona, Ltd., 45
Hawaii 373, 369 P.2d 96 (1961), reh. denied, 45 Hawaii 443, 369 P.2d 114 (1962); Shields
v. Yonge, 15 Ga. 349 (1854). Recently the United States Supreme Court recognized a
wrongful death action under general maritime law and noted that the Baker "rule has
been criticized ever since its inception, and described in such terms as 'barbarous."'
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 382 (1970). Using Moragne as
precedent, Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222, 229 (Mass. 1972), "held that the right to
recovery for wrongful death is of common law origin .... " An action for wrongful
death under general maritime law is to be distinguished from a common law action
which is in addition to an existing statutory action. Moragne applies to maritime
wrongful death actions not covered by the Death on the High Seas Act. 46 U.S.C. §
761 (1976). Thus, when plaintiff attempted to recover damages for loss of society
(recoverable under a general maritime wrongful death action but not available under
DOHSA) in a death action that clearly fell within the ambit of DOHSA, the Court
stated:
The Death on the High Seas Act ... announces Congress' considered judgment on
such issues as the beneficiaries, the limitations period, contributory negligence,
survival and damages . . . . The Act does not address every issue of wrongful
1981]
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wrongful death could have been granted under the first sentence of
article 2315 in the Hubgh case,"0 an action nevertheless was not
granted, and the legislature has acted. Only more confusion would
result if the courts were to attempt to circumvent the wrongful
death statute"' and to expand the classes of beneficiaries by allowing
parties to bring an action under the first sentence of Civil Code arti-
cle 2315."2
Another possibility is to treat the listing of beneficiaries as il-
lustrative rather than exclusive. Since Louisiana is a civil law juris-
diction, the rule that statutes must be construed strictly because
they are in derogation of the common law does not obtain. Thus, as
commentators have urged,'" the court is not bound to a strict con-
death law, . . .but when it does speak directly to a question, the courts are not
free to "supplement" Congress' answer so thoroughly that the Act becomes mean-
ingless.
Mobile Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978).
40. See note 4, supra.
41. Malone, supra note 9, at 1071-76; Keeton, Statutes, Gaps, and Values in Tort
Law, 44 J. AiR. L. 1, 12 (1978). Frustration with the injustice resulting from wrongful
death statutes has prompted several commentators to urge that a common law cause
of action be recognized as a solution to inflexible and limiting statutes. That solution
would provide only instantaneous and momentary relief, for the inevitable incon-
sistences that necessarily would exist between the "new" cause of action and the
wrongful death statute undoubtedly would create confusion. For articles urging that a
common law action be recognized, see Note, Wrongful Death in Tennessee-New Solu-
tions to Recurring Problems, 9 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 85, 103 (1979); Note, Decedent's
Heirs Under the Utah Wrongful Death Act, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 77, 93; Note, Wrongful
Death Recovery in Colorado-A Reward for a Timely Demise, 49 U. CoLo. L. REV.
431, 436-37 (1978).
42. In Sutton v. Rogers, 222 So. 2d 504 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969), the court, using
Civil Code articles 229 and 2315 in conjunction, allowed a grandfather to collect limited
damages for his grandson's death:
For the payment of these expenses, the grandfather was under a clear legal
obligation produced and thrust upon him- by the wrongful acts of the defendant.
The provision of LSC-C.C. Art. 2315 that "Every act whatever of man that
causes damage to another, obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it ..."
is obviously appropriate to the situation here. Except for defendant's tortious
acts, plaintiff would not have been required to furnish his minor grandson hospital
and medical expenses and to provide for his interment. To the extent of these ex-
penditures, the amount of which is stipulated, plaintiff directly and individually
sustained damages to which he is entitled to be reimbursed by the defendant.
Id. at 507. But see Young v. McCullium, 74 So. 2d 339, 341 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954) (un-
cle was denied funeral expenses; "[i]f the deceased were still living, the petitioner
might have a just cause of action against him for funds expended on his behalf.
However the said codal articles [articles 2315, 23161 give no such right of action against
a third party").
. 43. Note, Peremption-Effect of Pending Suit on Period of Limitation of Surviv-
ing Tort Action-Article 2315, Louisiana Code of 1870, 24 TUL. L. REV. 373, 375 (1950).
Professor Johnson wrote:
Article 2315 is not in derogation of the common law; it is not in derogation of
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struction of the statute." A few recent cases also have alluded to
the possibility of expanding the classes by an illustrative reading.45
But while support exists for such an approach, and while it would be
preferable to the present unduly strict and exclusive reading of the
statute, expansion by an illustrative reading is not the best solution.
An illustrative reading would have no effect on the mutually ex-
clusive classes, and even though some plaintiffs who previously
were denied standing might be granted a right of action," the
court's efforts would continue to be directed toward forcing the
plaintiff within the confines of the statutory enumeration of possible
beneficiaries. As in the past, the most important issue-the extent
of plaintiffs injuries-would be relegated to secondary importance,
to be addressed only if a plaintiff falls within the arbitrary dictates
of the statutory scheme.
The best solution is to amend the statute so that members of
the family unit who actually are damaged by the wrongful death of
the deceased can recover their losses from the tortfeasor. A close
examination of wrongful death reveals that the state's interest in
protecting the family unit is at the very core of the statute. 7 The
anything. There was no reason at all to adopt the common law maxim of strict in-
terpretation of statutes which departed from the common law. And yet, for years
and years, the Louisiana jurisprudence has confidently concluded that the article
has to be strictly construed, when in fact there is no reason to interpret the arti-
cle in a different fashion from any other article or statute.
Johnson, supra note 16, at 7.
44. See Keeton, supra note 41, at 11-12 for an observation that could be used to
support an illustrative reading of the statute. Professor Keeton points out that courts
often confuse "lack of authorization in the statute to a prohibition in the law as a con-
struction of the statute ... (even though the construction is by necessity judicial hand-
iwork)." Id. at 11.
45. Roche v. Big Moose Oil Field Truck Serv., 381 So. 2d at 402-03 (La. 1980) (Den-
nis, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). As Justice Dennis maintained in
Roche:
Because of the wrongful act of another of [sic] the children in the present case
were injured. They were deprived of support, love and affection, and of a father.
Although they may not fit technically within any of the present categories of 2315
I believe that an examination of the purpose of the statute would require that
person who caused the damage to repair it.
Id. at 403. See King. v. Cancienne, 316 So. 2d 366, 369 (La. 1975).
46. The "almost adopted" children of the instant case surely would have been
granted an action under an illustrative reading. Such a reading also should open the
door for unadopted stepchildren, stepparents, and grandchildren. But inherent in-
equities would still exist. See notes 25-28, supra, and accompanying text.
47. See notes 12, 13 & 17, supra. Wrongful death statutes exist in all fifty states,
and though the statutory designation of beneficiaries varies from state to state, all
statutes evidence a concern for the family. For a compilation of all state wrongful
death statutes, see S. SPEISER, supra note 5.
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family is a unit whose sum is greater than its parts, for its members
provide one another with stability, strength, and mutual protection.
When this unit is impaired by the wrongful death of one of its
members, the tortfeasor should repair that damage in order to help
assure the preservation of the damaged family unit.
The present wrongful death statute reflects this idea; in fact,
given the traditional background of the family, the statute's organ-
ization is logical. Ordinarily, an individual would be expected to be a
member of a family unit consisting of a spouse and children. If he
were not a member of that unit, the next most likely unit would en-
compass the decedent and his parents. And if he were not a member
of either of these groups, he probably would be associated closely
with his brothers and sisters. 8
However logical in light of traditional family groupings, article
2315's arbitrary listing of named beneficiaries leaves no room for
flexibility. 9 At the turn of the century, the statutory scheme may
have effectively protected the family. Unfortunately, the statute
presupposes the existence of a family unit that, especially in today's
society, too often is at odds with reality. Changing lifestyles and the
increasing rate of divorce have altered the traditional composition of
the family unit. ° Nonetheless, the state's interest in preserving the
48. See notes 18-19, supra.
49. The legislator should remember that one cannot "anticipate all the drawbacks
that practice alone can reveal; [for] to anticipate everything is a goal impossible of at-
tainment." Levasseur, Code Napoleon or Code Portalis?, 43 TUL. L. REV. 762, 767-69
(1969).
50. In fact, the traditional concept of the word "family" is also in a state of flux.
The writer uses the word to denote a certain relationship among individuals that does
not depend upon a legal or a blood connection.
In France, the Cour de Cassation determines who may bring an action under
wrongful death by using French Civil Code article 1382, which is the equivalent of the
first sentence of article 2315. In the past, the French courts required the existence of a
juridical relationship between the deceased and the plaintiff asking for compensation,
but a landmark decision in 1970 declared that article 1382 does not require "l'existence
d'un lien de droit." Cass.Ch. mixte, 27 fevrier 1970; veuve Gaudras c. Dangereux. S.J.
1970. II. 16305. In Gaudras, the court allowed a concubine to recover damages sustained
as a result of the wrongful death of her paramour. Continental decisions are extremely
brief, but the report of the case stated that this concubine had a stable relationship
with the deceased. Id. The same emphasis on the stability of the relationship is found
in Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 1031 (La. 1978), in which a concubine col-
lected workers' compensation benefits for the death of her paramour. After noting that
the couple "had been living together as man and wife for eleven years ... in a stable,
loving relationship," the court stated that a "dependent member of the family group is
entitled to compensation regardless of blood relationship or the technicalities of in-
heritance law." Id. at 1032. For a suggestion that the same result might obtain under
wrongful death, see Note, Death Benefits for a Concubine Under Louisiana's
Workmen's Compensation Law, 39 LA. L. REV. 269, 277-78 (1978).
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family unit should not depend upon that unit's composition." The
symbolic importance of the family remains as a source of order, sta-
bility, nurture, and protection. In fact, the state's interest is harmed
when protection is denied to such a damaged family, for the state
often will have to bear the economic burden of caring for the family.
Indeed, the family may not be able to remain intact, thus indirectly
harming the state even more; for the disruption of the family unit is
not conducive to the common good.
The task, then, is to devise a statute that will accord effective
protection to the family unit damaged by the wrongful death of one
of its members. The statute should be flexible, yet limited. Since the
wrongful death action is designed to protect the family, the tort-
feasor should owe a duty only to members of the deceased's family
unit.2 But if the statute is to function effectively in actual practice,
the exact composition of the hypothetical family cannot be specified
with any degree of precision. Most families, however, will conform
to the traditional patterns contained in the present statute.54 Treat-
ment of family members who do not fall within the confines of the
presently designated beneficiaries should not present much difficul-
ty to the courts; identifying family members is simply a matter of
using common sense. Thus, although the beneficiaries should not be
51. That a member of this unit might be technically a stepfather rather than a
"legal" father should be irrelevant. See note 24, supra, and accompanying text. The
court even now examines the actual relationship (as opposed to the "legal" relation-
ship) when damages are measured. If the survivors were part of the deceased's family
unit (using the term to indicate a particular relationship among the members), then
these beneficiaries inevitably wbuld be damaged by a member's wrongful death. Con-
versely, regardless of the plaintiffs legal relationship to deceased, recovery is denied
when no "family" relationship exists. See Mitt v. Security Ins. Co., 361 So. 2d 465 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1978), in which the legal father and the biological mother were denied
recovery, and the biological father, with whom the deceased had lived, was compen-
sated.
52. The term "family unit" should be read broadly and not limited unnecessarily
by an artificial criterion, such as living in the same house. For example, a divorced
parent and his children would certainly comprise a family unit, regardless of whether
or not he had custody of those children as long as a relationship of economic or emo-
tional dependency existed.
53. The civilian approach to drafting statutes is "to set, by taking a broad ap-
proach, the general propositions of the law, to establish principles which will be fertile
in application, and not to get down to the details of questions which may arise in par-
ticular instances." Levasseur, supra note 48, at 769. The judge and the legislator then
work in tandem, for "having been entrusted by the legislator with the principles most
favorable to the common goodethe civilian judge can go about his task to consider men
as individuals, where the legislator considered them en masse." Levasseur, Bridging
the Channel, 41 LA. L. REV. 74 (1980).
54. See note 18, supra.
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named specifically, as they are now, the remedy need not be
available to everyone. 5
To determine whether an individual falls within the ambit of the
protected family circle, the court should look to those elements that
are most characteristic of such a unit. The most common characteris-
tic of any family unit is economic dependency. Examination of this
factor should present no difficulty for the court, in light of the large
body of case law already existing in workers' compensation," and to
some extent, in wrongful death actions. 7 However, in a wrongful
death action, unlike in workers' compensation, 8 the court should
look to the entire relationship. For wrongful death purposes, the
family is recognized largely by identifying its members as part of
the total economic unit.
Another characteristic element of the family unit is emotional
dependency. Unless emotional support is a factor in defining the
55. For purposes of judicial economy, the immediate family (those presently listed
under article 2315) could be accorded a presumption of standing to bring suit under the
statute. Other individuals seeking redress could be required to show cause (ie., facts
tending to show membership in the family unit) for being allowed an action. Thus a
long-lost cousin who suddenly appears would not qualify as a beneficiary, regardless of
the cousin's professed grief. Even if the cousin's grief is genuine and he is damaged,
his interest is not one that wrongful death historically has sought to protect.
56. Economic dependency must be proved. In Samoyoa v. Michel Lecler, Inc., 310
So. 2d 162 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975), the good faith putative spouse and children were
held to be the "legal dependents" of the deceased and therefore entitled to workers'
compensation benefits. The deceased had a legal wife and children, but since he had
not supported them in years, they were not economically damaged by the deceased's
death.
57. Since economic dependency is not used to identify the beneficiaries in
wrongful death actions, the court's treatment of damages under article 2315 is not as
ubeful as the court's examination of economic dependency under workers' compensa-
tion. However, the elements of damages recoverable under wrongful death provide
useful guidelines for defining the ambit of the family circle. The "courts have con-
sistently held . . . that funeral expenses; loss of support; compensation for sorrow,
grief and mental anguish occasioned by death; loss of love, affection, companionship,
and guidance, are recoverable elements of damages." Zagar v. Romero, 134 So. 2d 696,
699 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
58. In Branch v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 370 So. 2d 1270 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979),
the parents of a negligently killed nineteen-year-old boy were restricted to workers'
compensation as the only available redress for their son's death. Since the parents
were not economically dependent on the deceased, they were effectively denied com-
pensation. Perhaps partially in reaction to Branch, the legislature amended Revised
Statutes 23:1231 by Act 509 of 1980, which states in pertinent part:
if the employee leaves no legal dependents, the sum of twenty thousand dollars
shall be paid to each surviving parent of the deceased employee, in a lump sum,
which shall constitute the sole and exclusive compensation in such cases.
The identity and number of these "parents" no doubt will be the subject of future
litigation.
[Vol. 41
NOTES
family members, the court would have to create fictions in order to
justify compensation for family members who lack an economic rela-
tionship with the decedent (e.g., no economic relationship exists be-
tween a nonworking mother and her child). Since the success of the
family largely depends upon pooling talents and dividing labor, to
evaluate the worth of a member solely on the basis of his economic
contribution is to ignore one of the primary attributes of the family
unit. 9 In short, the basic examination of the family unit should focus
on the interdependence of its members for economic and emotional
support. 0
Administrative problems and initial uncertainty may accompany
any revision of article 2315, but these difficulties certainly would not
be insurmountable. To avoid multiple suits by various members of
the family, the action could be brought by a personal representa-
tive.9 ' All interested parties could be required to join this action.62
Since the action would be granted to protect those who fall within
the ambit of the deceased's family circle, notice should not be a
problem. The very nature of the relationship among the beneficiar-
ies should assure their awareness of the proceeding.
The state can and should protect and foster relationships that
provide stability and mutual support for its citizens. Surely the
legislature did not mean to deny protection to "almost adopted"
children damaged by the wrongful death of their prospective father.
Article 2315 should be amended so that, in the words of the article
itself, survivors who have been injured may "recover the damages
which they sustain through the wrongful death of the deceased."
Those who have a "cause" of action should also have the "right" to
bring it.
Docia D. Wyatt
59. See, e.g., Marceleno v. State, 367 So. 2d 882 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
60. Each member's loss will not be identical. See Dyson v. Gulf Modular Corp.,
345 So. 2d 1222 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977), for the court's assessment of the amount of
damages due to each of five major children, five minor children, and one estranged
wife.
61. The Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) provides that "the personal
representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages . . . for the exclusive
benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative." 46 U.S.C.
§ 761 (1976). The wrongful death statute in Ohio also calls for a personal represent-
ative to bring suit for "the surviving spouse, the children, and other next of kin of the
decedent." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.02 (Page).
62. See note 61, supra.
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